Mīmāṃsā

From INDOLOGY :: FAQ

(this draft had originally been writen for the Routledge History of Indian Philosophy, edited by P. Bilimoria)

Contents 1 Introduction 2 Historical Development 3 Mīmāṃsā as exegesis 4 Epistemological Issues 5 Linguistic Issues 6 Deontic Issues 7 Mīmāṃsā and God 8 References

[edit] Introduction

Mīmāṃsā ("inquiry" or "reflection") is one of the six traditionally recognised Indian philosophical systems (darśana). Originating from an ancient tradition of scriptural exegesis, it maintained as its primary focus the Veda. The foundational text of the school is mainly concerned with rules for systematically interpreting Vedic passages. At the same time, it opens with a chapter on theoretical issues: the nature of dharma, the means of knowledge, and language. Thus, from the very outset Mīmāṃsā did not refrain from taking up philosophical themes.

[edit] Historical Development

The bulk of the system is based (as usual in India) on a collection of aphorisms (sūtra), the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (hence MS). The MS is traditionally attributed to Jaimini, who is also mentioned in the Vedic exegetical literature (see Parpola 1981), and, among other 6 authors, in the Vedāntasūtra and in the MS itself. Similarly, Bādārayaṇa, who is traditionally believed to have been the author of the Vedāntasūtra is often mentioned in the MS and in the Vedāntasūtra itself. The Vedānta system is indeed also known as Uttara-Mīmāṃsā, as opposed to the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, or simply Mīmāṃsā. These names are commonly interpreted as referring to the chronological development of the two systems (accordingly, Uttara-Mīmāṃsā would just mean "later Mīmāṃsā" and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā "prior Mīmāṃsā") and indeed the Vedāntasūtra was probably modelled in its definitive form along the lines of the MS. But, maintains Parpola (1981), it is also possible that the denominations “Pūrva Mīmāṃsā” and “Uttara Mīmāṃsā” originally referred to the two parts of a unitary Mīmāṃsāsūtra, whose prior part (Pūrva-MS) came to be attributed to a single one of its authors, Jaimini, whereas the later part (Uttara-MS) had been attributed to another one of its authors, Bādārayaṇa. In this way, one can better understand the deep links between Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā, in ancient as well as modern India. Both are based on Vedic exegesis and share the same hermeneutical rules. They differ insofar as they focus on the Brāhmana (the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) or on the Upaniṣad portions of the Veda, respectively, and, consequently, on orthopraxy (the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) or on achieving insight into the ultimate reality (brahman). But these differences could be better understood and evaluated if one considered that they were originally two parts of the same system. This system was distinguished by its methodology, namely, the exegesis of the Veda, whereas different purposes where aimed at through it. Nowadays, most paṇḍits are conversant with both systems and do not see any contradiction between them (see Clooney 1990: 255-8).

Commentaries were probably composed on the entire MS in ancient times, but the oldest preserved commentary, Śabara Svāmin's Bhāṣya ("Commentary", hence ŚBh), treats only the Pūrva-MS. The success of the ŚBh is probably responsible for interruption of the transmission of its predecessors and for a more rigid partition between the Pūrva-MS and the Uttara-MS (see VEDĀNTA). The ŚBh is composed in a fluent and agreeable Sanskrit style , and touches on all the themes which were later to become central in the "golden" age of Mīmāṃsā philosophy. Śabara attacks Buddhist opponents, but his attacks are too general to support any attempt at dating him precisely. He quotes Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (SEE) and, of course, Vedic literature, but no later author –except certain unidentified Mīmāṃsā predecessors. Thus, he has been assigned to the 3-5 century AD, but solely on the basis of internal and stylistic evidence. In the 7th century AD commentaries on the ŚBh were written by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra. Their chronological relation is still unsettled, though I believe they were more or less contemporary (so also Thrasher 1979:119), as otherwise the younger would have certainly reacted against the other. In fact, their views often diverge so much that two sub-schools are traditionally believed to have been founded by them, the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara. Maṇḍana Miśra, who flourished one generation later, and who wrote both Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta works, acknowledges most Bhāṭṭa tenets, but elaborates further Kumārila's doctrines of error and of prescription in three independent treatises that deeply influenced the Indian debate, and which are also of interest because they are some of the earliest monographies we have in Indian philosophical literature.

Prabhākara's style is often terse and dense, so that most classical and contemporary authors prefer to quote from his follower, Śālikanātha Miśra (8th to 9th century ), who wrote two independent treatises besides a commentary on Prābhākara's commentary on the ŚBh. Among those, the Prakaraṇa Pañcikā resembles a modern work in its thematic exposition of the Prābhākara system. A reply to Śālikanātha's exposition of the Prābhākara system was undertaken by Kumārila's commentator Pārthasārathi Miśra (11th century), whose works became the standard reference for the Bhāṭṭa system. Before him, Kumārila's Ślokavārttika (a commentary on the tarkapāda of the MS and on the ŚBh thereon), had already been commented on by Uṃveka Bhaṭṭa (8th century) and Sucarita Miśra (10th century). On the other hand, Kumārila's Tantravārttika (a commentary on MS from the second chapter of the first book through the third book, and the ŚBh thereon, dealing mainly with exegetical principles) has been commented on by Bhāvadeva (11th century), Paritoṣa Miśra (12th century) and Someśvara Bhaṭṭa (13th century). Although Advaita Vedānta (SEE) and the theistic schools of Rāmānuja, among others, borrowed many of their principles from both sub-schools of Mīmāṃsā, the Bhāṭṭa system enjoyed greater success.

Most Mīmāṃsā treatises after the 13th century specialize on ritual (Mīmāṃsā itself tends to be studied as a sacrificial discipline, preliminary to the study of Vedānta), and do not contribute much to the discussione of philosophical issues. For more details on later Mīmāṃsā authors see Verpoorten 1987, and the Introduction in R. Śāstri 1936.

[edit] Mīmāṃsā as exegesis

Many modern interpreters of Indian philosophy have doubted whether Mīmāṃsā really deserves the title “philosophy”. Indeed, its foundational text, the MS, contains just a short introductory chapter dedicated to themes relating to what we would consider philosophy. Thereafter, it presents a complex system of exegetical rules for making sense of Vedic passages. However, the Mīmāṃsā differs from the mere exegesis of difficult Vedic passages precisely insofar as it aims at providing general rules of interpretation. Indeed, the rules create a coherent edifice out of a mass of sacrificial prescriptions, and the same rules have been adopted since ancient times in Indian juridical literature. In fact, the Veda as understood by Mīmāṃsakas shares two important features with the system of law as understood in most modern legal theories –it is independent of any author (laws are said to become independent of their authors as soon as they are promulgated, so that they are to be interpreted independently of the intention of law-givers), and it is concerned with what should and should not be done (SEE INFRA EPISTEMOLOGY, DEONTICS).

The exegetical rules developed by the Mīmāṃsakas being intended for making sense of difficult Vedic passages, they presuppose that all Vedic passages ultimately make sense. This theme is in fact directly addressed in MS 1.2, immediately after the opening chapter on epistemology and linguistics. In response to objections that the Veda is either meaningless, false (where it contradicts direct experience) or futile (where it states, e.g., "fire is hot"), Jaimini and Śabara explain how the only portions of the Veda which are directly means of knowledge are prescriptions (vidhi). On the other hand, explanatory passages (arthavāda, such as "Wind is the fastest Deity") have an ancillary role and serve to glorify the results to be reached through performing the rituals prescribed, etc. They do not directly yield knowledge and are to be interpreted figuratively as eulogizing the Deity to whom the sacrifice is offered, the result to be obtained through the sacrifice, or the various substances employed and procedures followed in the sacrifice. In this way, Mīmāṃsakas are able to interpret Upaniṣad statements such as “The self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought about, to be meditated on” as consistent with ritual duty as the ultimate purport of the Veda1. The depriving descriptive statements of any independent epistemic status makes any fundamentalist reading of the Veda by Mīmāṃsakas very unlikely.

[edit] Epistemological Issues

The Mīmāṃsā from its inception is intent on portraying the Veda as the unquestioned source of knowledge as regards dharma. The Veda is assumed to be without defect; whatever may look like a contradiction, a falsehood in it, etc., can be explained away by proper interpretation. Thus, a definite epistemological position is intrinsic to Mīmāṃsā: the Veda yields knowledge, human beings have only to make sense of it, and any possible mistake is due to them. However, the Veda is employed as an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) only with regard to dharma, which is defined as "what has to be done", and as leading one to heaven (the Mīmāṃsā definition of dharma is strikingly minimal if compared with the emphasis on dharma as religious and moral norm common to much Indian literature). Thus, the Veda enjoys an absolute authority, which is however strictly deontic. A pious Brahmin, kṣatriya or vaiśya –that is, a member of one of the three upper classes of Hindu society, to whom the Veda is addressed– has to act, to perform sacrifices and rituals as prescribed in the Veda, and this deontic authority extends over them regardless of their belief commitments. Mīmāṃsā does not require adherence to a fixed system of beliefs but only correct conduct. In this way, the Mīmāṃsā is at the same time a tenacious defense of the Veda's authority and an empiricist system. The Veda is the only instrument that can yield knowledge about what one has to do, whereas for knowledge of everything else, one has to rely solely on one's faculties. Furthermore, the Mīmāṃsā is crudely anti-metaphysical and skeptical as soon as it veers away from dharma. Mīmāṃsakas (e.g. Kumārila, ŚV codanā 139) laugh at "blind believers", and boast of their repudiation of extraordinary powers, superhuman beings, etc., and in general, of their avoidance of any unnecessary assumptions. Kumārila professes himself an empiricist and seems to apply a sort of Ockham's razor when he declares : "By the Mīmāṃsakas [...], now, as always, nothing is accepted, besides what is directly perceivable [...]" (ŚV, codanā 98d-99ab).

The means of knowledge accepted by all Mīmāṃsakas are sense perception (pratyakṣa, which is limited to the sense faculties, as opposed to any kind of intellectual intuitions; see YOGIPRATYAKṢA), inference, linguistic communication, analogy, and exclusion. Bhāṭṭas accept Human Communication alongside the Veda as a form of linguistic communication, whereas the Prābhākaras argue that since humans are, unlike the Veda, fallible, one has, in their case, first to ascertain the reliability of the speaker, and then to infer the validity of what one hears from the mental content of the speaker. Hence, human communication is according to this school a sort of inference; the only form of linguistic communication which is a means of knowledge unto itself is the Veda. Moreover, Bhāṭṭas introduce “absence” as instrument of knowledge. This is the means, they argue, consisting in the non arousal of the other means of knowledge and by which one grasps the absence of something. So, through sense perception we can grasp the table, but it is only through absence as an instrument of knowledge that we can grasp the absence of our glasses on it. Prābhākaras, on the other hand, like Buddhists and others, claim that one grasps absences through inference from the non-perception of what would have been perceived, had it been present. This instrument of knowledge is obviously closely related to the acceptance of a distinct metaphysical category of absence, which itself was controversial in Indian philosophy, being accepted only by the Bhāṭṭas and Naiyāyikas.

The main characteristic of the Mīmāṃsaka epistemology is the self-validity theory. This appears in essence already in the ŚBh and is fully developed by Kumārila. Its core consists in crediting every cognition, as soon as it arises, with full validity. Thus, every cognition from the moment it arises presents itself as valid, unless and until it is later falsified by a succeeding cognition. The opposite opinion (held by Naiyāyikas, SEE NYĀYA, and Buddhist Epistemologists, SEE PRAMĀṆAVĀDA), i.e., only those cognitions that have been somehow confirmed are valid, leads, according to Mīmāṃsakas, to a regressus ad infinitum. If every cognition has to be tested, then even the testing cognition has to be tested, and even the cognition testing the testing cognition has to be tested, and so on. If one, instead, proposes that there are certain cognitions which are intrinsically valid and which can therefore test other cognitions without needing any further test, then –writes Kumārila– since one would have to stop the regress at a certain point, why not stop at the first step? It might possibly be objected that the certainty thus reached would never amount to the absolute certainty most Western thinkers believe is required for knowledge. But Kumārila's fallibilistic approach does not weaken the conclusions attained. For, unless and until contrary evidence arises, doubting an established conclusion is useless, and this can and must, therefore, count as knowledge. In regard to the Veda, the self-validity theory amounts to saying that the Veda is by itself valid unless and until it is proven to be false. But, since its sphere of application is dharma, and since dharma cannot be known by human beings, as it is not accessible to human means of knowledge, the Veda can never be falsified. Hence, it is fully valid. Some Western scholars, like Sheldon Pollock and John Taber, have argued that in this way the Veda stands uncontradicted merely by default. A Mīmāṃsaka would reply by saying that, as intellectual intuition, yogic perception, etc., are sheer fantasies, dharma must lie beyond the reach of human faculties. So, either one accepts the Veda as an instrument for knowing dharma, or one is stuck in agnosticism. Moreover, the Veda is not considered by Mīmāṃsakas as just one among many possible authorities on dharma. It is not like the Buddhist Scriptures, which are validated on the basis of their origin –the Buddha. Buddhist Scriptures are not to be trusted, because they are supposed to have been issued from a human being whose extraordinary compassion, which was allegedly the foundation of his omniscience, cannot be proven. Rather, the Veda is already the commonly accepted authority as regards dharma and nothing impugns its authority. All else being equal, we should continue to rely on it as our guide in knowing what we should and should not do.

Both the main sub-schools of Mīmāṃsā have offered an original account of erroneous cognition. Their common point of departure is the doctrine of the self-validity of cognitions –the ultimate foundation for direct realism, which all Mīmāṃsakas defended in opposition to Buddhist idealism. The Bhāṭṭa view of error resembles the Naiyāyika one in holding that perceptual error consists chiefly in grasping something according to the aspect of something else. Following a standard example of error, one believes one is apprehending silver instead of the mother-of-pearl one actually has in front of one's eyes. The erroneously apprehended silver, explain the Bhāṭṭas, has been seen elsewhere and is now remembered. Thus, error is by no means creative, and imagination plays no role in it. Prābhākaras are even more radical in maintaining that, strictu sensu there is no error at all. What appears to be an error is instead an incomplete cognition. One cognizes, e.g., rightly but incompletely the mother-of-pearl as something bright and lustruous, and one remembers rightly the silver, but fails to grasp its memory-character. One only fails to distinguish between the lustruous and indefinite object one has before one's eyes and the lustruous silver one remembers.

[edit] Linguistic Issues

Linguistics is perhaps the most well-known aspect of Sanskrit culture. The study of language is historically linked with the importance of the Veda, which led to the development of phonetics, metrics, etc., in ancient times. A systematic analysis of language, however, developed somewhat later in Mīmāṃsā and Grammar (vyākaraṇa). As in its analysis of Vedic ritual (SEE ABOVE), Mīmāṃsā did not just explain single instances of linguistic use, but rather attempted a comprehensive, systematic study of linguistic phenomena as a whole. The relative chronology of the first linguistic descriptions attempted by Mīmāṃsakas or Vaiyākaraṇas is difficult to determine, but the two systems appear to have been in close contact since their very beginning. Pāṇini's terminology is frequently informed by ritual (so, e.g., his definition of the syntatical object as “the most desired [element of the sentence]”), whereas the first statement of Kātyāyana's commentary on Pāṇini's Grammar very closely resembles MS 1.1.52. This sūtra depicts the relation between word and meaning:

The relation of word and meaning, on the other hand, is natural. Knowledge of [dharma] is the instruction [of Sacred Texts], and it is infallible in regard to an unperceived entity. This is an instrument of knowledge [of dharma], according to Bādarāyaṇa, because it is independent.

The second part of the sūtra refers to the exclusive relation between dharma as an epistemic content and the Veda (here called “instruction”) as an instrument of knowledge (SEE above, epistemology). The interpretation of the first part of the statement, however, is more challenging. “Autpattika", which I translated as "natural" is a derivative of utpatti, "origin", and thus it could also mean "originated". But all commentators, starting from Śabara and the Vṛttikāra (whose commentary, now lost, is quoted by Śabara in ŚBh ad MS 1.1.5) interpret it rather as "apauruṣeya", –non-human, not depending on a human author (according to the Vṛttikāra)– or as "nitya", fixed (according to Śabara). This evokes the above-mentioned gloss of Kātyāyana stating that "The relation between word and meaning is established (siddha)", for siddha is explained in Patañjali's commentary thereon as "nitya". In sum, according to this sūtra, the relation between word and meaning escapes any possible human agency. With MS 1.1.5 and the commentaries thereon, however, Mīmāṃsakas do not propose a historical account. Rather they underline, with their typical commitment to the world as it is observed now, that language is not at the disposal of humans. Although it is spoken by humans, it is not invented or even really altered by them. It is always there ready to be used; it logically pre-exists any possible author. The Vṛttikāra elaborates further by explaining (against Naiyāyika and Buddhist conventionalism) how a creator of linguistic conventions is simply unthinkable. In order to establish a convention, one would indeed need words to say, e.g., “x means this”, “y means that”. Words would also be needed in order to transmit such a convention to other people. So, the public nature of language is evidence of its independence of any human author. The Mīmāṃsā developed a detailed linguistic analysis using as its main focus the Veda. Hence, it concentrates primarily in understanding the way language can convey prescriptive meaning, since the Veda is believed to consist chiefly in prescriptions (see above, EPISTEMOLOGY about the deontic authority of the Veda). Both sub-schools agree in maintaining that the (unitary) sentence meaning is conveyed by words. Against Bhartṛhari's sphoṭavāda (SEE GRAMMAR, see Chakrabarti 1989), which holds that word-meanings are only postulated ex post out of the unitary sentence meaning, they argue how cumbersome it would be for every sentence to have a unique, unanalyzable meaning. One would have to postulate a completely different meaning of a sentence whenever a word is added. The sentences "Bring [the] cow", "Tie [the] cow", "Bring [the] horse", "Tie [the] horse" would all have to be learned separately according to the sphoṭavādins, whereas Mīmāṃsakas maintain that by learning the meanings of "bring", "tie", "cow", and "horse" it is possible to understand all sentences composed of those words.

According to the Bhāṭṭa theory of sentence meaning, the so-called "connection of what has been expressed" theory (abhihitānvayavāda), words initially convey their meanings, then those word-meanings combine to form a unitary sentence meaning. According to the Prābhākara "expression of what has been connected" theory (anvitābhidhānavāda), instead, the words express their meanings only insofar as they are already connected with the meanings of all other words of the sentence. Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras are particularly engaged in combating each other's depiction of language and language learning. Bhāṭṭas accuse the Prābhākaras of not accounting for our intuition that we understand the meaning of a sentence through the meanings of its individual words. Prābhākaras are in the difficult position of having to fight both the Bhāṭṭas and the sphoṭavādins. Against the former, they maintain that our intuition is that the sentence meaning is conveyed through words. Thus, to postulate the intermediate stage of an awareness of unconnected word-meanings is an unnecessary assumption. Words express instead an already related meaning, that is, they express a meaning which is ready to be linked to the other words in the sentence. This means that "cow" has a slightly different meaning in "bring the cow" and "tie the cow", as it is linked with a different word in each case. In one case it conveys as meaning "cow+<bringing>" and in the other "cow+<tying>". Vice versa, "bring!" in the same sentence conveys the meaning "bring+<cow>", whereas it would convey "bring+<horse>" in case of "bring the horse!", and the same holds true for "tie!". In order to justify this view, the Prābhākara recurs to the requisite of saturation (ākāṅkṣā) as necessary in order to identify a sentence meaning. Thus, in "bring the cow!", "bring!" is non-saturated and this non-saturation "evokes" the word's counterpart, "cow". At this stage, the seemingly common sensical Mīmāṃsā position already looks somehow artificial. However, it may be that all explanations of how language works, when they get too close to the actual speech acts, come to similar oddities (and indeed Chomsky's explanations are not less obscure). Whatever the case, already in the ŚBh's discussion on saturation (ŚBh ad 1.2.17) an objector proposes the following case. Suppose one hears "Bring the cloth!". In one's mind, the first word conveys the meaning "bring+<cloth>", and the second "cloth+<bring>". But what if the sentence goes further, say "bring the cloth, [the] white [one]" (in brackets are the words not needed in Sanskrit)? One cannot claim, follows the objector, that "white" is expected, since "bring" had been already saturated by "cloth". But then, is the meaning saturated or not? Mīmāṃsakas have no answer apart from the appeal to actual cases. So, in "bring the cloth, [the] white [one]!", "bring" and "cloth" are still unsaturated just because there is actually an extra word. The Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara accounts further differ as regards the import of a sentence. Prābhākaras state that it is something to be done, as in the Veda, whereas Bhāṭṭas maintain (as with all other Indian and Western linguistic systems) that a sentence conveys (i.e., describes) something already established. In order to accommodate within this view Vedic prescriptions, Bhāṭṭas say they convey a urge, called “linguistic bhāvanā” (SEE DEONTIC).

[edit] Deontic Issues

With "deontic" is indicated the field of philosophy dealing with prescriptive language, its logic and the epistemological issues raised by it. Mīmāṃsā's very commitment to the Veda made it reflect on prescriptive statements long before this field of logic had been developed in the West. Kumārila, Prabhākara and Maṇḍana Miśra described differently the action of prescriptive language on human beings. Śabara (ŚBh ad MS 2.1.1-4) explained it by saying that verbal endings are endowed with a power of bringing about, called bhāvanā (lit. "the causing to be", causative form of the root "to be") consisting in the undertaking of an action by human beings. The verbal root constitutes, according to this analysis, the instrument (karaṇa), and the sentences describing minutely the ritual constitute the procedure (itikartavyatā). The result, e.g., heaven, is embedded in the formula enjoining the ritual, e.g., "the one who desires heaven....". So, in Śabara's periphrases, " one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the new- and full-moon sacrifice" becomes "Heaven (result) is caused to be (bhāvanā) through a sacrifice (instrument) with such-and-such ritual actions (procedure)". But this account neglects the specificity of prescriptive forms. So, Kumārila adds to the bhāvanā conveyed by all verbal endings and indicating human effort another bhāvanā, specifically conveyed by prescriptive endings, and enjoining such effort. This “linguistic bhāvanā” has the human effort, that is, the bhāvanā, as its result, and the awareness that the action enjoined will lead to something desired as its instrument4. The eulogy raised by arthavādas and praising the action to be undertaken constitutes its procedure. Maṇḍana Miśra, instead, states that the effect of prescriptive language on human beings can only be explained by assuming that prescriptions directly convey the idea that the action enjoined will lead to something desired. This theory is countered by Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras alike, since, according to both schools, being prescribed is not tantamount to being a means to a desired end. Unike the Bhāṭṭas, Prābhākaras maintain that prescriptive endings convey the idea that the action enjoined is to be done, i.e., that it is one's duty (kārya). Since something to be done cannot exist abstractly, such duty has to be supported by an action, which is hence secondarily signified by the same prescriptive endings. In common usage, sentences often refer just to the action, but this happens only through secondary signification (lakṣaṇā, SEE). Through the Veda, instead, the duty can be known in its non-preceded (apūrva) nature, that is, as something which cannot be known through any other instrument of knowledge. As already hinted at, the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara views on prescriptions have important consequences on their linguistic theories (SEE LINGUISTIC ISSUES).

[edit] Mīmāṃsā and God

As a system, the Mīmāṃsā is atheist. The vedic deities are just considered as one of the elements of the vedic sacrifice adn their rank is not higher than the one of ritual substances. The Mīmāṃsā develops many cogent arguments against the existence of God, both from an internal and from an external perspective. In fact, the Mīmāṃsā school states that the belief in God is internally untenable and that it consists in unnecessarily postulating something unseen.

As for Mīmāṃsakas, instead, almost all Mīmāṃsakas after the 9th century seem to be theist. They open and often close their works by dedicating them to God (usually a form of Viṣṇu) and some of them further develop on the relation between the sacrificial action if performed according to all prescriptions and the non-interested action performed in order to obey to God (so, for instance, in the concluding chapter of the Arthasaṅgraha). Modern and contemporary Mīmāṃsakas usually believe in God and display sectarian tilaks, etc. In my opinion, this contradiction can be solved because the God negated by the Mīmāṃsā system is an ontological sustain to weak theories, rather than an object of devotion. Devotion is not negated nor laughed at, though any essay of developing a rational theology and theodicy is keenly rejected.

[edit] References

• "Mīmāṃsāsūtra, Śābarabhāṣya, Tantravārttika", in Mīmāṃsādarśana, ed. by Vināyak Gaṇeś Āpṭe, Ānāndāśrama, 1929-.
• Puruṣottama Bilimoria, 1988, Śabdapramāṇa: Word and knowledge a doctrine in Mīmāmsā-Nyāya philosophy (with reference to Advaita Vedānta-paribhāsā ’Agama’) towards a framework for Śruti-prāmānya (Studies of Classical India, vol. 10), Kluwer, Dordrecht.
• Arindam Chakrabarti, 1989, “Sentence-holism, context-principle and connected-designation anvitabhidhana:three doctrines or one?”, Journal of Indian Philosophy 17, pp. 37-41.
• Francis X. Clooney, 1990, Thinking Ritually, De Nobili, Vienna.
• R.C. Dwivedi (ed.), 1994, Studies in Mīmāṃsā: Dr. Mandan Mishra felicitation volume, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.
• Gaṅgānātha Jhā, 1942, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā in Its Sources, Benares Hindu University, Benares (19642nd).
• Kataoka, Kei, 2003, “The Mimamsa Definition of Pramāṇa as a source of new information”, Journal of Indian Philosophy 31.1-3, 2003, pp. 89-103.
• Lawrence McCrea, 2000, “The hierarchical organization of language in Mīmāṃsā interpretive theory”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 28.5-6, pp. 429-459
• K.T. Pandurangi (ed.), 2006, Pūrvamīmāṃsā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View: Volume II Part 6: History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, India Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture, New Delhi.
• Parpola, Asko, 1981, “On the Formation of the Mīmāṃsā and the Problems concerning Jaimini with particular Reference to the Teacher Quotations and the Vedic Schools I”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-Asiens, 25: 145-177.
• Parpola, Asko, 1994, “On the Formation of the Mīmāṃsā and the Problems concerning Jaimini with particular Reference to the Teacher Quotations and the Vedic Schools II”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-Asiens 38: 293-308.
• V. A. Ramaswami Śāstrī (ed.), 1936, Tattvabindu by Vācaspatimiśra with Tattvavibhāvanā by Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara, Annamalai University, Annamalainagar 1936.
• John A. Taber, A Hindu critique of Buddhist epistemology: Kumārila on perception: The ’Determination of perception’ chapter of Kumārilabhaṭṭa’s Ślokavārttika. Translation and commentary, RoutledgeCurzon, London 2005.
• Allen Wright Thrasher, 1979, "The dates of Mandana Misra and Samkara", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ost-Asiens 23, pp. 117-140.
• Jean-Marie Verpoorten, Mīmāṃsā Literature, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1987.
• Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, Der ’Organismus’ des urheberlosen Veda: eine Studie der Niyoga-Lehre Prabhākaras mit ausgewählten Übersetzungen der Bṛhatī, De Nobili, Wien 1997.